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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
BARBARA J. MOTES, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v, : Case No. 88-0015-CA 
PRESTON J. MOTES, : Priority No. 14b 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
000O000 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case involving a 17 1/2 year marriage. 
The parties married at the start of the husband's military 
career. They had four children, three of whom are still 
minors. At the time of trial the wife was 44 and a nursing 
supervisor and the husband was 45 having retired from the Army 
in June of 1984. Shortly before separation, the wife received 
an inheritance from her father7s estate. A half day trial 
was held on July 30, 1987. The husband had counsel, the wife 
appeared pro se. Among other things, the trial court valued 
the marital estate; awarded more to the husband than the wife; 
awarded one of the tax exemptions to the husband; and did not 
divide or allocate the husband's military pension and the 
$5,129 as the wife's pension plan. Instead, the trial court 
deferred a ruling on the pension plans until the husband's 
child support obligation ended a period of approximately 5 
years. It then allowed the husband to retain and use all of 
his monthly retirement payments and based its child support 
award on that income. The wife has appealed on the pension 
plan and exemption issues. The husband has cross appealed 
claiming appreciation on the wife's inheritance should have 
been considered by the trial court in the property 
distribution. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Mrs. Motes seeks the following relief on appeal: 
1) A reversal of the trial court's decision relating to 
Mr. Motes' military retirement, an order remanding 
this issue to the trial court for a determination of 
its value and inclusion in the overall property 
distribution or in the alternative, awarding Mrs. 
Motes 1/2 of the monthly retirement payment 
retroactive to the date of trial. 
2) An order awarding her the right to claim all 
children in her custody as exemptions for Federal 
Income tax purposes. 
3) An award of all of her attorney's fees and costs 
related to this appeal and the defense of Mr. Motes' 
cross appeal. 
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4) An order dismissing and denying Mr. Motes7 cross 
appeal as being without merit. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
MARITAL HISTORY 
This case involves the termination of a 17 1/2 year 
marriage. (R-2) The parties married in February of 1967. 
(R-2) Mr. Motes was 28 years old and Mrs. Motes was 27. (TR-
5) Mr. Motes had graduated from West Point in June of 1965 
(TR-66) with a degree in engineering. (TR-90) Mrs. Motes had 
a three year diploma in nursing. (EX 5) Mr. Motes became a 
career officer on active duty until his retirement in June of 
1984. (TR-68) During that time, the parties had four 
children, (ages 18, 16, 14 & 13 at the time of trial) (TR-5) 
Because of Mr. Motes7 military career, the parties moved 
fourteen times. (TR-52) Mrs. Motes gave up pursuing her own 
career so that Major Motes could pursue his. (TR-52) While 
in the military, Mr. Motes was also able to secure a Masters 
in Business Administration from the University of Utah in 
1977. (TR-50) Mrs. Motes secured a Bachelors in nursing 
from the University of Utah in 1980. (EX 5) She became a 
nursing supervisor at the University of Utah in 1984. (EX 5) 
Through their joint efforts, the parties acquired an 
equity in a home, Major Motes' military retirement, Mrs. 
Motes7 $5,129 University of Utah Retirement, automobiles, 
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personal property, savings and credit union accounts and some 
debt. (EX 1) One of the savings accounts with a balance of 
$41,263 (EX 1) was acquired without Mrs. Motes' knowledge. 
Mr. Motes said he "squirreled (it) away from Mrs. Motes over 
the course of the years by hiding it and sticking it into this 
account so this money would accumulate that she wouldn't 
spend." (TR 21 Vol. II) 
In June of 1984, Major Motes retired from the Army. He 
was 43. (TR-5) He began receiving $1,484 per month in 
retirement pay and went to work as a financial consultant for 
the Salt Lake firm of Waddell & Reed. (TR-6) He testified he 
was not salaried but only an independent contractor. (TR-6) 
In 1985, Mrs. Motes' father died and left a will naming 
her as his only heir. (TR-45) She received approximately 
$130,000 in cash. (TR-38,41) From that she gave each of her 
children $20,000 which was deposited into investment accounts 
under the Uniform Gift to Minors Act (TR-39,42), used some of 
the monies for family expenses (TR-11,42) including a car for 
the parties' older son (TR-39) and retained some in her own 
account. (TR-69) 
POST SEPARATION 
The parties separated in April of 1986 (TR-51) after what 
the record reflects to be an extremely violent relationship 
(TR-35,36,37,87) including one incident where Major Motes beat 
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Mrs. Motes and tore the ligaments in her leg, causing the leg 
to be in a cast for six weeks. (TR-37) 
At the time of trial in July 1987, Mrs. Motes was a 
nursing supervisor working full-time at the University 
Hospital. She earned a gross monthly salary of $2,205. (R-
191) Mr. Motes claimed she netted $1,745 per month. (TR-5) 
She was also going to school in an attempt to secure her 
Masters in nursing. (TR-54) She felt that without a Masters 
her present position of nursing supervisor was a "dead end 
job." (TR-54) In addition, she was caring for and raising 
the parties' four children. 
After retirement, Mayor Motes used the MBA he acquired 
during the marriage to become a financial planner. He said he 
worked as an independent contractor for Waddell & Reed, a Salt 
Lake investment firm. (TR-6) The record is unclear as to 
what he made from that employment. In April of 1986, in his 
Verified Response to Mrs. Motes' Order to Show Cause, he 
stated he earned $330 per month and had $220 per month in 
business expenses. (R-27) In October of 1986, his Verified 
Financial Declaration stated that in addition to his military 
retirement he earned $626.72 per month from Waddell & Reed, 
had $220 in business expenses, and earned an additional $385 
per month from investments. (R-71-77) At trial, he testified 
under oath that he earned only $248 per month from Waddell & 
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Reed and had $330 per month in expenses. (EX-6,TR-61) On 
cross examination, he said he thought this alleged net loss 
each month would continue for another 3-4 years. (TR-91) 
There is no evidence in the record to reflect an attempt 
by Mayor Motes to secure any other employment. 
TRIAL & TRIAL COURT'S RULING 
This matter was tried on July 30, 1987, before the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup. Mr. Motes was represented by David 
Dolowitz, Esq. and Mrs. Motes represented herself. Her 
counsel had withdrawn approximately three weeks before. (R-
150) The parties met with the Court throughout the morning in 
an attempt to reach a settlement. (TR-3) (Evidently that 
proceeding was not recorded.) Those settlement efforts failed 
and trial began at 2:00 p.m. (TR-3) Mrs. Motes testified in 
her behalf and was briefly cross examined. Mr. Motes 
testified and was cross examined by Mrs. Motes. 
Throughout the proceeding, Mrs. Motes claimed an interest 
in Mr. Motes military retirement (TR-31,51) while Mr. Motes 
claimed that the retirement was not an asset but rather an 
income stream not subject to division. (TR-32 & Ex. 1) (A 
copy of Ex. 1 is included in the Addendum to this brief.) He 
also said he would give up his claim to an equity interest in 
the home and a portion of Mrs. Motes' inheritance if the Court 
would award him his retirement. (TR-71) No evidence was 
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offered as to the present value of the retirement• He also 
said he would be willing to pay a total of $200 per month in 
child support for the three remaining minor children. (TR-73) 
He wanted a portion of the appreciation he claimed occurred 
in connection with the accounts established for the children 
and Mrs. Motes from her father's inheritance. (TR-69) 
Later in the evening, Judge Rigtrup ruled from the bench. 
A copy of that portion of the transcript (TR-23-35 Vol II) 
together with the Findings and Conclusions signed by the Court 
(R-190) have been included in the Addendum to this brief. In 
summary, the trial court ruled as follows: 
1) Decree of Divorce - Each party was awarded a 
divorce from the other. 
2) Custody - Mrs. Motes received custody of the 
three minor children. Mr. Motes received 
liberal visitation. 
3) Child Support - Mr. Motes was to pay $175 per 
month per child beginning August 1, 1987. 
4) Exemptions - Mr. Motes was allowed to claim the 
youngest child as an exemption for tax 
purposes. Mrs. Motes received the two older 
children. 
5) Alimony - Each party received $1 per year 
alimony. 
6) Children's Accounts - Mrs. Motes was awarded 
the right to manage the children's accounts. 
7) Marital Residence - Mrs. Motes was awarded the 
marital residence and was required to pay the 
$1,033 per month first trust deed payment and 
two other debts related to the residence having 
principal balances of $7,500 with monthly 
payments of approximately $271. 
8) Trinidad Note - Mr. Motes received the Trinidad 
Note which generated a payment of $315 per 
month payment. It was a result of the sale of 
certain real property the parties had earlier 
owned. 
9) Mrs. Motes' Inheritance - Mrs. Motes was 
awarded her inheritance and any related 
appreciation. 
10) Attorney' s Fees - Each party was to pay their 
own. 
11) Overall Property & Debt Distribution - Mrs. 
Motes received $87,707 in property and Mr, 
Motes received $99,913 with the unequal 
division being made to compensate Mr. Motes for 
any financial services he may have rendered to 
Mrs. Motes and/or the marital estate in 
relation to Mrs. Motes' inheritance. (R-2 03) 
12) Retirement - The Court did not divide or 
consider Mr. Motes' military retirement nor the 
$5,129 in Mrs. Motes' retirement. Rather, it 
allowed Mr. Motes to use the monthly payments 
of $1,484 to pay his child support and reserved 
a ruling on the final disposition of the 
retirement accounts until Mr. Motes' obligation 
to pay child support terminated. (R-203) 
Findings, Conclusions and a Decree were prepared by Mr. 
Motes' counsel and signed on December 19, and entered on 
December 21, 1987. (R-190-217) Mrs. Motes filed her Notice 
of Appeal on December 29, 1987, (R-22 0) and Mr. Motes filed a 
Notice of Cross Appeal on January 12, 1988. (R-224) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I 
RETIREMENT 
It was reversible error for the trial court to not 
consider Mr. Motes' interest in his military retirement as a 
marital asset at the time of trial. It was required to do so 
under this Court's holding in Greene v. Greene, 751 P. 2d 827 
(Utah App. 1988) which stated that a military retirement is a 
marital asset subject to division in divorce actions. By so 
doing, Mrs. Motes has been deprived of the use and benefit of 
income generated from an asset in which she has approximately 
a one half interest. The trial court should have divided the 
monthly retirement payment being received by Mr. Motes in 
accord with the formula set out in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 
P.2d 431, (Utah 1982) and Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 
(Utah App. 1987) . By failing to do so and deferring a 
decision as to how the plan should be divided, the trial court 
has in effect required Mrs. Motes to underwrite Mr. Motes' 
child support obligation. The decision of the trial court as 
it relates to the parties' interest in Mr. Motes' military 
retirement plan should be vacated. 
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II 
TAX EXEMPTIONS 
Custody of the parties' 3 minor children was awarded to 
Mrs. Motes. However, the trial court allowed Mr. Motes to 
claim their youngest child as an exemption for Federal Income 
tax purposes. Although there had not been a definitive 
statement from the Utah Courts on who is allowed to claim 
exemptions at the time of trial or when the Notice of Appeal 
was filed, the recent case of Martinez v. Martinez, 80 Utah 
Adv.Rep. 35 (Utah App. 1988) resolves that issue in favor of 
Mrs. Motes. Under federal law, she, as the custodial parent, 
is automatically allowed to claim the children in her custody 
as exemptions. The trial court erred in allowing Mr. Motes to 
claim the youngest child as an exemption. 
Ill 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Under Utah law, a military retirement is a marital asset 
subject to division and/or distribution at the time of trial. 
The trial court's decision to defer consideration of this 
asset for five years while allowing Mr. Motes all the income 
from the asset to meet his child support obligation is an 
unprecedented departure from established Utah law. Mrs. Motes 
had no other alternative than to appeal. Likewise, Mr. Motes' 
claim that the trial court erred in not considering his 
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alleged efforts in investing Mrs. Motes' inheritance when in 
fact it did, makes Mr. Motes' cross appeal unmeritorious. 
Mrs. Motes has been required to address these two issues and 
she should not be required to bear the financial burden of her 
attorney's fees and costs. Mr. Motes should be required to 
pay her fees and costs related to the appeal and cross appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
NOT TO CONSIDER MR. MOTES' 
MILITARY RETIREMENT PLAN IN THE 
OVERALL PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION 
WHILE ALLOWING HIM TO RETAIN AND 
USE ITS MONTHLY INCOME FOR A 
PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS IS 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The principal issue on this appeal is whether or not the 
trial court was correct in the way it dealt with Mr. Motes' 
military retirement. The facts needed to analyze that issue 
are as follows: 
1) Over a 17 1/2 year marriage, the parties acquired an 
interest in a military retirement based upon Mr. 
Motes' career in the army. (TR-5, 66-68) 
2) In 1984, Mr. Motes retired from the army and began 
receiving monthly retirement benefits which at the 
time of trial were $1,484. (TR-66-68) 
3) At trial, Mr. Motes did not feel his retirement was 
a marital asset (Ex. 1 - See Addendum) but argued 
that it was only an "income stream." (TR-32,33) 
4) At trial, Mrs. Motes felt the retirement was a 
marital asset. (TR-31) 
11 
5) Based upon the foregoing, the trial court deferred 
any division of the military retirement for 5 
years, allowed Mr. Motes to have the entire monthly 
payment and based his child support obligation on 
that monthly retirement payment. (R-203) 
It is crystal clear that under Utah law an interest in a 
retirement plan is an asset subject to consideration and 
division in divorce actions. [See Enalert v. Englert. 576 
P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978)] 
It is likewise without question that a military 
retirement is not different from any other type of retirement 
and should be considered and distributed by the trial court in 
the property distribution. A very similar fact situation is 
found in the recent case of Greene v. Greene, 751 P. 2d 828 
(Utah App. 1988) where a military retirement had been acquired 
during the marriage and the husband retired and began 
receiving monthly retirement payments before the divorce 
action was filed. In rejecting the husband's argument that 
the retirement benefit was income rather than property, the 
Court analyzed positions taken by various jurisdictions in 
conjunction with statements made by the Utah Supreme Court on 
the issue of retirement plans [e.g. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 
P.2d 1076, 1078-79 (Utah 1988)] and stated: 
Therefore, we hold that military 
retirement benefits accrued in 
whole or in part during marriage 
constitute marital property 
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under Utah law and are subject 
to division in a divorce 
proceeding. 
Greene at 831. 
It does not matter whether the interest in the plan is 
vested or not vested. What is essential is that the trial 
court consider and include the asset in its overall property 
distribution. As was stated by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431, 432-433 (Utah 1982): 
[if] the rights to those benefits are 
acquired during the marriage, then the 
court must consider those benefits in 
making an equitable distribution of the 
marital assets . . . 
[w]hether that resource is subject to 
distribution does not turn on whether the 
spouse can presently use or control it, or 
on whether the resource can be given a 
present dollar value. The essential 
criterion is whether a right to the 
benefit or asset has accrued in whole or 
in part during the marriage. To the 
extent that the right has accrued, it is 
subject to equitable distribution. 
Id. (emphasis added) 
In the present case, Judge Rigtrup did not follow the 
mandate of Woodward, supra and Greene, supra. While 
acknowledging that the military retirement was an asset of the 
marriage, he simply gave the asset to Mr. Motes for 5 years by 
allowing him to retain all of the income it generated. 
An analogous situation clearly demonstrates the error of 
the trial court. If the parties had acquired a $120,000 
savings account during the marriage and that account paid 
interest at the rate of 10% per annum, the parties would 
receive $12,000 per year or $1,000 per month in income from 
the asset. No trial court would ever consider isolating that 
savings account from a property distribution while at the same 
time allowing one party to use the $l,000/month income to meet 
a support obligation owed to the other party. To do so 
deprives the one party of income generated by an asset in 
which he or she has a one half interest while at the same time 
assists the other party in his or her support obligation by 
allowing use of funds one half of which are properly the 
property of another. The foregoing is exactly what Judge 
Rigtrup did by not dealing with the military retirement and 
demonstrates exactly the reason why his decision is so unfair 
to Mrs. Motes. 
The "tough" questions of contributions and valuations 
present in so many of the retirement plan cases are not 
present in this case. The parties married in 1967. Mr. Motes 
had been a participant in the military retirement for 
approximately 2 1/2 years before the marriage and he retired 
June 30, 1984. (TR-66-68) At the time of trial, he was 
receiving $1,484 per month in retirement pay. It would have 
been simple, fair and proper for the trial court to have used 
the formula for division set out in Woodward, supra, and cited 
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with approval in the recent Court of Appeals case of Marchant 
v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987) and simply divided 
the monthly payment received by Mr. Motes as the trial court 
did in Greene, supra. As Judge Davidson stated in Marchant, 
supra, a case involving division of a government pension plan 
interest: 
In a situation such as the 
instant case, the court decree 
could state that plaintiff was 
entitled to a monthly payment, 
at the time of defendant's 
retirement, of one-half of his 
total monthly payment times the 
fraction in which the numerator 
consists of the number of years 
or months they were married 
during which defendant was 
employed by the federal 
government and the denominator 
is the total number of years or 
months defendant was in such 
employment. 
Id. at 206. 
Judge Rigtrup's failure to divide the monthly pension 
plan payment at the time of trial using the formula set forth 
above constitutes a failure to follow established Utah law and 
justifies a reversal and a remand for an appropriate division. 
Further, any such division should necessarily include 
reimbursement to Mrs. Motes of her share of the monies from 
the monthly retirement payments which have been received by 
Mr. Motes since July 30, 1987 - the date of the trial and 
Judge Rigtrup's decision. 
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One final point needs to be addressed in anticipation of 
an argument Mr. Motes will attempt to make. That is - If he 
does not have use of the entire monthly military retirement, 
he will have inadequate funds with which to pay his child 
support. As the matter now stands, Mrs. Motes is underwriting 
Mr. Motes' child support obligation to the extent of one half 
of the military retirement payment which is hers and which he 
is receiving. Should this Court remand this matter as has 
been requested by Mrs. Motes, it may very well be that the 
trial court will have to re-evaluate what is an appropriate 
amount for Mr. Motes to pay by way of child support. It can 
then also take into account that Mr. Motes is now only 46 
years old, has a Bachelors Degree in engineering and a 
Masters Degree in Business Administration and loses $100 per 
month in his job as a financial planner ($248 income minus 
$330 expenses) (EX. 6 & TR-61) while Mrs. Motes earns only 
$2,205 per month gross salary as a nursing supervisor, has 
$1,033 per month as a first trust deed payment, approximately 
$2 71 per month in payments on debts related to home 
improvements, is going to school to secure her Masters Degree 
and is raising three teenagers. All of these are factors 
which the trial court should consider should it appear that 
Mr. Motes7 monthly income will be altered by a reallocation 
and redistribution of his monthly pension plan payment. 
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Judge Rigtrup's decision regarding the parties' interest 
in Mr. Motes' pension plan should be reversed. The case 
should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to 
award Mrs. Motes her share of the monthly retirement payments 
received since the date of trial and for the entry of an 
appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Order to deal with 
retirement payments to be received in the future. 
POINT II 
MRS. MOTES AS CUSTODIAL PARENT 
WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE EACH OF 
THE CHILDREN AS EXEMPTIONS FOR 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX PURPOSES. 
Trial in this case occurred on July 30, 1987. No 
evidence was presented on the issue of income tax exemptions. 
The trial court made no mention of the issue during its ruling 
from the bench at the conclusion of the trial. (TR Vol II p. 
23-35) No mention is made of it in the Minute Entry. (R-152) 
For reasons not revealed in the record, a paragraph related to 
this issue found its way into both the Conclusions of Law (f 
6, R-196) and the Decree. (f 6, R-207) Its inclusion was 
evidently approved by the trial judge given his 
interlineations and concomitant initials which appear in each 
paragraph related to the exemption issue. 
The Findings and Decree as signed, awards Mr. Motes the 
exemption for the youngest child, Charissa, so long as he is 
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current in his support obligation. 
At the time the Decree was signed and at the time of the 
filing of Mrs. Motes7 Notice of Appeal and Docketing 
Statement, there were no cases which addressed the issue of 
whether or not, absent an agreement to the contrary, the 
custodial parent was entitled as a matter of right to claim 
the children as tax exemptions under federal law. 
On April 19, 1988, this Court issued its opinion in the 
case of Martinez v. Martinez, 80 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. 
1988) which, in part, held that federal law superceded state 
law on the federal income tax exemption issue and absent 
certain exceptions (i.e., a Pre-1985 instrument or an 
agreement of the parties), related to allocation of the 
exemptions, the custodial parent was automatically entitled to 
claim any children in his or her legal custody as exemptions. 
In this case, Charissa is in the legal custody of Mrs. 
Motes; there is no pre-1985 instrument; and Mrs. Motes did not 
agree to relinquish her right to claim Charissa. Therefore, 
based on the current state of the law in Utah, it was error to 
award Mr. Motes the exemption for Charissa. The Findings and 
Decree should be amended to delete paragraph 6 of each so as 
to allow Mrs. Motes to claim the exemption beginning with the 
1987 tax year. 
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POINT III 
MRS. MOTES IS ENTITLED TO BE 
AWARDED THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
COSTS INCURRED BY HER IN THE 
MAINTENANCE OF THIS APPEAL AND 
THE DEFENSE OF RESPONDENT'S 
CROSS APPEAL. 
Section 30-3-3 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) is the 
statutory basis for an award of attorney's fees in divorce 
actions. It states that: 
The Court may order either party to pay 
to the clerk a sum of money . . . to 
enable such party (adverse) to prosecute 
or defend the action. 
Id. (Parenthetical language and emphasis added) 
This section has been interpreted to apply to attorney's 
fees incurred both at the trial and appellate levels. See 
Dahlbera v. Dahlbera, 77 Utah 157, 292 P.214 (1930) and Carter 
v. Carter, 584, P.2d 904 (Utah 1978). 
Clearly, the statute gives this Court the authority to 
award Mrs. Motes her attorney's fees to allow her to 
"prosecute" the appeal to a successful resolution in her favor 
and also to allow her to "defend" Mr. Motes' cross appeal. 
Mrs. Motes has now had to unnecessarily expend attorney's 
fees and costs to bring the error of the trial court in its 
handling of her husband's military retirement to the attention 
of this Court so that her interests in one of, if not the most 
substantial marital asset is protected. It was Mr. Motes who 
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urged upon the Court his "income stream" theory, a theory 
which the trial court erroneously adopted for at least a 
period of five years. Mrs. Motes will also have to respond to 
a cross appeal on an issue which the record clearly reflects 
was considered by the trial court and resolved in a manner 
well within the ambits of its discretion in divorce actions. 
This Court should award Mrs. Motes all of her attorney's 
fees and costs related to this appeal and cross appeal and the 
matter should be remanded to the trial court for a 
determination of the same and entry of an appropriate 
judgment against Mr. Motes. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court should have divided the monthly 
retirement payments being received by Mr. Motes at the time of 
trial in accord with the formula established in Woodward, 
supra, and Marchant. supra, and in the manner provided in 
Greene, supra. To have failed to do so has deprived Mrs. 
Motes of her interest in a marital asset and has the 
additional effect of requiring her to underwrite her husband's 
child support obligation for a period of five years. The 
decision of the trial court should be vacated and the matter 
remanded with instructions to award Mrs. Motes her share of 
the monthly retirement payments received since trial and enter 
an appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Order for 
20 
retirement payments to be received by Mr, Motes in the future. 
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MOTES V, MOTES 
PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY 
I.tem . Value/Equ j ly 
Fid* . . .i^toJ 
Fam..> S . ; 3, 800 
Wilson Davis $ 50 
i cles 
19 7b Cac : . . a v so Id) !,? ,1, 0 01) 
1980 Oldsmobile 300 
1982 Volvo $ 7,300 
1986 jpt f-,-« ; 7 nnn 
Tax Fund 
**Vanguard Fund $1,149 
Insurance 
Army Mutual Aid $ 3,1QG 
Ret i rement 
U n I vers 11 / in II1 i ill 
Wasatch Home *$36,823 $19.i>0 
Trinidad Propf ' $35,000 
Horizon Lots 
Accounts 
United Funds $i./,jou 
Continental $ 8,QQQ 
Magellan Fund $19,0^ "'"1  '• §.9. 38S 
Stock Accounts 
*Lcauh ro-K)dpjinG Equity wu**..*.^ ^ , u 
$ 3 6
 f 3 / 
**v: 
Furniture & Furnishings 
1/2 1/2 
Cash Accounts 
*Estate Cash (w) $32,384 
U of U Credit Union(w)$ 7,680 
Air Defense Center 
(savings) (h) $ 375 
Air Defense Center 
(checking) (h) $ 1,000 
Pentagon Credit Union 
(w) $ 3,721 
Pentagon Credit Union 
(h) $ 275 
First Security 
(checking)(h) $ 500 
$234,282 
$32,384 
$ 7,680 
$ 3,721 
$116,567 
$ 375 
$ 1,000 
$ 275 
$ 500 
$116,566 
FT032787E 
^Present Value - $112,384 because of defendant's investments and 
constant supervision of account (original investment $80,000). 
Includes children's accounts. 
No Alimony 
Child Support - $150/mo. per child 
Each Party Pay Attorney Fees 
2 Tax Exclusions for each party. 
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ft i s s u e s ? T h e s e a r e a r g u m e n t a t p*fe , a n d 
\j\ ' t :i n c 1 1 n ed a nd d o e s n , t: r e aJL<T y g o b a ck 
t h e w a t e r * iejc^Lne b n u y e . 
MOT^S< Thje-fe - - ^ - - - - * - i r t h < 
9 
10 
11 
12 
1 3 
1 4 
1 5 
1 6 
1 7 
181 
1 
201 
2X| 
2 21 
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-5-B-E - €^&R5-e——¥-e-«—ro-ay - s t e-p—d o w nu 
I * :ii ] ] g r a n t a < 3 i v< :> r c e t o bo t h p a r t I e s 
o n. t: h e g r o u n d s o f :i r r e c o n c i 1 a b 1 e d i f £ e r e n c e s , w h ii c h 
w i l l b e f i n a l i ipo i i e n t r y • 
C u s t o d y o f t h e c h i ] d r e n a r e awa r d e d t o 
t h e j : • 11 c :i i 11: ii f f s i I II: j e :: t t • ::: • i: e c 5 :) n a I: Il  = c i I • 3 111 i lb < * i: a 11 
v i s I t a t i o n w i t h t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s t o b e w o r k e d o u t 
b € t: i ; • =i • E!' i i t h ::!' • :: I i ill I! ("ill r € i i c i i • ill t II!:: = • ii :II : f c t 1 i = • J : : • i: 1 2 1 1: : :: ' i r s ' 
i o 11. c e . 
El c: 11: I ]:: • a r f: i e s c , J : e |: E; r lit a i :it • = • i: :i t J! j i: € • s 1 1 : a i i i e • ill! 
f rom mak i n g ci en i g r a t i n g s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t 11: ie o^the r t o 
t h e t wo c h 1 3 ci r e n or coramu n i c a t i n g a n y n e g a 11 \ e or 
adverse comments about the other to the children. 
•<,. .. .. :. ,; Mr. Motes / yoi l are permanently 
•: e s 11: a i i i s • • 3 f i: c r " ii i :t ii t ii a ill :ii :i l g 1 I: : = • 
2 5 ) a r t i c u J a r r e l e v a n c e Il I y < i i u i m it I *» [»u t d * . u p p o r t 
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alimony or whatever the Court awards, state it and not 
use dupli-entendres initials* It is meant in a 
sarcastic light from all that I see and observer and 
you need to quit cutting and chopping at each other* 
Enough is enough is enough. 
I'm going to order child support in the 
amount of $175 per month per child payable one half on 
the 5th and one half on the 20th. 
I will order both parties to pay the 
other one dollar per year alimony. 
Both parties are to retain for the 
benefit of the minor children the current life 
insurance until the last child is beyond the support 
obligation. 
I'm a little disjointed, but support 
shall continue until the children obtain the age of 18 
years or graduate from high school, whichever last 
occurs, provided the child is still at home and in his 
age-appropriate class. 
Both parties are to maintain existing 
and future health, accident, hospital, medical, 
dental, optical coverage as they are able to obtain 
through their respective employments, and each are to 
pay one half of expenses not covered by insurance. 
Mrs. Motes is restored to what name? 
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MS, M O T E S : Asa I a 
TIII- I" 11 nil 
M S * M "II I I' Y e s 
8 
I 
1 0 
J I  
1 2 
Jl ! 
1 4 
1 !•) 
1 6 
1 9 
1 ( I I I , I I li I III ( < ' 1 1 ; III III If mi in i II in i i 1 i i mi ( j i n III 
u p o n M o t e s , b u t it y i n m n«i i in i I in I e b e i t . 
E a c h p a r t y i r» I. u m q n e s s e n t i a l u iid 
necessary documents to carry out the terms aau ine 
provi sI ons of the d e c r e e . 
ThII f' o i n o n a I |M < p m I ; ' i n .M « a II di Il I n e a c h 
p a r t y 1 in p o s s e s s i o n e x c e p t ; a s in o d i f i e d b y t. h e J i s t s e t 
in I in ii II1!1! :i i, I i i II in II „'" i i ii1: iiiiii i i i i f i <" Il  i i i I llh in ," 1 ii Il  . 
Plaintiff Iu awarded the accounts held 
mi IIIIII 1! llh " I i in I ell i. e n e i i .iiiJiie! e i in I! Ii <i i i iii "> I i i HI II" i n II 
defendant is directed Lu I M I n over all account 
information and account dat.- *• ~ *-he t.^;. \, A" . -t 
w i l l be up to you U whanyc wnu man^T^s tiie account, 
o r w h atever I a s 50,11,6 a 2 1 t h e r e i s o *• ** ~ iccount are 
• , • ' 
M R • M. 0 T E S : T h a t ' s c o r r e c t,. 
21 wha.tever you, wa < • 
23 T H E C 0 U RT : Y o u c a n t r a 11 s £ e r t h e m t o 
ands !!fou can transfer the £u 11 ds to other 
25 agents 
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1 The home is awarded to plaintiff free 
2 and clear of any claim of the defendant subject to the 
3 first mortgage and subject to the payment of the 
4 Pentagon Federal Credit Union obligation in the 
5 approximate amount of $4,000 and the Northwest 
6 Financial obligation in the approximate amount of 
7 $3,500, 
8 MS. MOTES: That Pentagon account was 
9 taken out in his name only. 
10 THE COURT: It is your obligation to pay 
11 it, hold him harmless from those obligations. The 
12 Trinidad property, or contract claim against the 
13 property, is awarded to defendant free and clear of 
14 any claim of the plaintiff. 
15 Each party is awarded one horizon lot, 
16 and each is ordered to quitclaim the interest of that 
17 party to the other. 
18 Mr. Dolowitz is to prepare two quitclain 
19 deeds for signature. 
20 Mrs. Motes, do you want one, or do you 
21 want two, or does it matter? 
22 MS. MOTES: Two what? Lot 1. 
23 MR. DOLOWITZ: Lot 8 and 9, your Honor, 
24 to be precise. 
25 MS. MOTES: I donft care. 
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COURT : 'ou p r e p a r e th* 
< j e e d howe v e r u r r u A l l - i t / a i i u O O >J t : j . u 
D e f e n d a n t I s a w a r d e d t h e 0 n 1 1 e d F u n d s 
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account. 
; ; > I! 1 1 i D 01.0 WIT Z : I re you go i n g down 
Exhibit 1 as we fve requested ? 
THE COURT- Yen. 
T ' l = • 111 9 HI 11 i I I 11 i I1' I I i i i w 
d e f e n d a n t . T he 1 9 8 2 y o l v n i J a w a r d e d i p l a i n L I f £. 
T1: i • • 11 9 8 6 3 e 1 1 : i : • : : i 111 i < I I' I I I 
i n h e r I t a n c e , and i s a w a r d e d t o p1 a I n t i f" £ < 111 r] he i : s o n , 
••; - ••; ; • . _ The 'v ai i g u a r d E; ' i"-", » i *l ' . " I ' M 
d e £ e n d a n t t o a p p 1 y II : • t a x e s • T h <» Arm y M u 11 J a 1 A I d F u n d 
o f $ 3 , Il  0 0 ii s a w a r d e d I: d e f e n d a n 1 • T h e i: e t i i: e m e n t 
wI t hi II: he U n I v e r s i t y o f U t a h o f $5
 f 129 w i l l b e t r e a t e d 
:i i i a m i n u t e o r two . . • . 
i i i e L 12 d n u n - a s s e t • 
i e : - : t - £ U t a h C r e d i t 
De f e n s e C e n t e r s a v i n g s o f t h r e e s e v e n ! y - f 
2: ; 
\ : ' 
awarded to the defendant. The Air Defense Center 
checking of a thousand is awarded to defendant. 
Pentagon Credit Onion account in the wife's name of 
$3,721 is awarded to plaintiff. 
The Pentagon Credit Onion account of the 
husband in the amount of two seventy-five is awarded 
to defendant. The First Security account of $500 is 
awarded to defendant. 
The defendant is ordered to secure a 
statement from Sears effective May 1, 1986, and 
ascertain the balance. He may take credit against 
said amount for the $20 paid on May 20th, '86, and for 
$10 paid in the checks from September 10 through 
February 20th. If he has underpaid, judgment may 
enter for the deficiency in favor of plaintiff and 
against defendant. If there is an overage, defendant 
may offset that overage against child support 
payments. 
The hundred and seventy-five dollars 
child support is effective August 1, 1987. 
Plaintiff is to pay the orthodontic 
bills and any portion of the psychiatric bills 
attributable to anyone other than defendant. If all 
the psychiatric bills are attributable to defendant, 
defendant is to pay for such charges if there are an] 
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THE COURT: Ycu have . -.. 
b races? 
MS. MOTES: Tv..
 c a . 
THE COURT: How much is that outstanding 
19 MS. MOTES: I t ' s 85 0 ami 7fifl 
T H K ( l I I I If | ; 11. i I I 
211 ' t b o d o n t i s t. b i l l . 
23i M a s t e r C h a r g e and thv. F i r s t Je» ' i i t y _ J - I " 
25 o b l i g a t i o n s i u ^ u i . i . c u a f t e r t > e p a i a t i o n xu emu a b o u n d 
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1 April, 1986. 
2 Each party to pay their own attorney's 
3 fees and costs. There's no evidence concerning fees. 
4 The Court can award no fees under those 
5 circumstances. The Court's not trying to slough one 
6 past you, Mrs. Motes, because you didn't know that, 
7 but I'm not your attorney. I'm not doing it for that 
8 reason, but you have substantial resources from which 
9 to satisfy your own fees. 
10 MS. MOTES: Major Motes cashed in $9,000 
11 to pay attorney's fees. May I be awarded one half of 
12 that? 
13 THE COURT: No. 
14 MS. MOTES: That was mutual property. 
15 THE COURT: He's going to pay the $6,00C 
16 that I just outlined. 
17 Are there any other outstanding billings 
18 that I have not alluded to? 
19 MR. DOLOWITZ: Were you referring to th< 
20 temporary order and picking that up when you said 
21 Master Charge, First Security? There was a temporary 
22 order, the June order, and that. Are you making that 
23 into a permanent order? 
24 THE COURT: I don't know what the 
25 temporary order was on that. 
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MR* DOLOWITZ: Those were the two 
21 obligations that you just named, Master Charge, First 
3 Security. 
4 THE COURT: I've just ordered him to pay 
5 them. 
6 MR. DOLOWITZ: And I think those were in 
7 the temporary order. 
8 THE COURT: Well, all right. But any 
9 balance due now, I'm ordering him to pay them. He got 
10 $9,000 that's gone for attorney's fees for his 
11 benefit. I'll order him to pay those two amounts. 
12 Are there any other bills beyond that? 
13 MS. MOTES: What about his retirement 
14 pay? 
15 THE COURT: I'm getting to that. Thatfs 
16 the issue -- I am saving the best for the last. 
17 Are there any other issues other than 
18 that? 
19 MS. MOTES: The Pentagon — 
20 THE COURT: With respect to temporary 
21 support --
22 MR. DOLOWITZ: We will cancel those. 
23 THE COURT: — Major Motes is to review 
24 his bank statements, his credit union accounts and 
25 verify the checks that have cleared as opposed to 
31 
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those that have notf and he is to bring the child 
support up to the level of 700 per month through 
mid-March of 1986 — '87. 
MR. DOLOWXTZ: We went off the record at 
that point. I was going to say that our records show 
that Preston, III# arrived at my client's house on 
March 4th at 2:00 a.m. It is the full month of 
March. 
THE COURT: All right. He is to pay 
$700 a month under the temporary order through 
February of 1987. From March 1, 1987, through May 31 
1987 he was to have paid $525 per month. And from 
that date forward, he pays 525 by virtue of the fact 
that there are only three dependent children. The 
earlier period of time is attributable to the fact 
that son, Preston, was living with him and was not 
being supported by his wife, by his mother. 
Mr. Motes is to make available or to 
perform reproduction work on records which any family" 
members want by transferring what's on the record to 
cassette tape for use by the plaintiff and the 
children. 
Mr. Motes is to reproduce any copies of 
slides or photographs desired by plaintiff or the 
children at the expense of plaintiff. Both parties 
32 
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are permanently restrained from insulting, molesting, 
intimidating, threatening or just general nonsense 
with respect to the other person. Have I missed 
anything except retirements? 
MR. DOLOWITZ: I think that covers 
everything. 
THE CODRT: The Court finds that 
plaintiff receives monthly retirement benefits of 
$1,484 per month. The Court has considered that 
amount in arriving at the ongoing child support of 
$175 per month per child. 
The Court finds that the plaintiff has 
accrued retirement benefits of $5,129. 
The Court reserves final disposition on 
both retirement accounts until the support obligation 
ends for the last child, and will review that issue 
and consider itf both accounts and both financial 
circumstances of both parties at that time. 
The Court recognizes that in the 
distribution as set forth, that Mrs. Motes -- and I 
adjusted the figures I think aloud -- a thousand 
dollars for the Oldsmobile, $6,500 for the Volvo. 
Using those two figures and adjusting $2,100 for the 
discrepancy in the calculation of equity, you have 
received through that process $87,707. 
33 
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Mr. Motes, you have received $99,913. 
The Court grants you the extra amount in consideration 
for your investment services, financial services 
rendered, which I think is generous to a fault. 
Any other things that I've missed? 
MR. DOLOWITZ: When the Court says 
99,000 — 
THE COURT: Mr. Dolowitz, since he's so 
capable, gets the privilege of drafting all this 
mess . 
MR. DOLOWITZ: I am looking at the 
valuations, your Honor. You had indicated the 87f707 
and 99 something. I didn't get that down completely, 
THE COURT: It's $99,913. The 32,000 is 
really a non-asset. You have got a very good rate of 
return for two years' time. 
MS. MOTES: In other words, five of us 
receive 87,000, and one person receives 99,000? 
THE COURT: I would expect you to reach" 
that plane given what you said throughout the trial. 
MR. DOLOWITZ: The Court is then not 
making any -- I will call it that way -- adjustment 
for the inheritances of Mr. Motes. You are simply 
disregarding --
THE COURT: I've awarded it to her, 
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haven't I? By awarding the accounts I have and the 
children's account to her, I think she's got it* And 
I've excluded it in dividing the assets. 
MR. DOLOWITZ: I just wanted to be clear 
on that. 
THE COURT: Except the difference. He's 
got $12,000 more, and I'm granting that in recognitior 
of the financial acumen and services that he's 
rendered in respect as to the increasing from eighty 
to a hundred and twelve thousand, or whatever the 
figure was, in a two-year period of time. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. DOLOWITZ: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: We are off the record. 
(Hearing adjourned.) 
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
BARBARA MOTES, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. D86-1615 
PRESTON MOTES, ) 
) Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Defendant. ) 
* * * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for 
trial on Thursday, the 30th day of July, 1987, the Honorable 
Kenneth Rigtrup presiding. The plaintiff was present in person, 
representing herself. The defendant was present in person and 
represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz. The court discussed 
the issues with the parties to see what could be resolved by 
agreement, then heard and considered the testimony of the par-
ties, examined the exhibits offered by the parties, and, being 
advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following as 
its 
FILED IN CLERK'S O ^ C E 
Salt Lake CounW ! Hah 
DEC 211987 
It. Court 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were both residents of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on the date this action was filed and each 
had been so for more than three months immediately prior thereto. 
2. The parties are husband and wife, having been mar-
ried February 11, 1967, in Ardmore, Pennsylvania. 
3. There have been four children born as issue of 
this marriage, three of whom, Kimberly, age 16, born October 19, 
1970; Tamara, age 14, born October 5, 1972; and Charissa, age 13, 
born December 27, 1973, are minors. 
4. The parties agreed that care, custody and control 
of the minor children of the parties should be awarded to the 
plaintiff, subject to liberal rights of visitation by the 
defendant. 
5. The plaintiff is 44 years of age, is presently 
employed as a nursing supervisor, where she supervises more than 
650 employees at the University of Utah Hospital and earns a 
gross income of $2,205.00 per month. 
6. The plaintiff acquired her nursing education dur-
ing the course of the marriage. 
7. The defendant is 45 years of age, a graduate of 
the United States Military Academy at West Point and has an 
M.B.A. earned from the University of Utah acquired during the 
marriage. He is presently retired from the United States Mili-
tary and receives $1,484.00 a month as retirement pay. In 
-2-
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addition, he receives $315.00 a month as payment on a note for 
the sale of property owned by the parties in El Paso, Texas, and 
has earned, on an average basis, commissions from his employer, 
Waddell & Reed, as a financial planner, $248.00 a month. He has 
incurred expenses in conducting his business at Waddell & Reed of a^cA^t^ 
$330.00 a month. 
8. In February, 1985, the plaintiff's father died. 
When the parties went to the home that he had occupied, they 
found and removed from the home $30,000.00 in cash. The 
plaintiff's father made plaintiff his sole heir and she has 
inherited the said $30,000,00 in cash at the time of her father's 
death, $100,000.00 in December, 1985; $7,500.00 in November, 
1986; and $3,000.00 in December, 1986, for a total of 
$140,500.00. The estate has not been finally distributed, but 
most of it has been disbursed. 
9. After the parties removed the $30,000.00 from the 
plaintifffs father's homef $20,000.00 was given to the defendant 
by the plaintiff to invest for their children and accounts were 
opened up in the sum of $5,000.00 for each of the four children 
'of the parties. After the $100,000.00 payment had been 
received, an additional $10,000.00 was set aside for each of the 
children of the parties. There are, now, $15,000.00 plus earn-
ings in the accounts of each of the children of the parties for a 
total of $60,000 plus earnings. 
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10. The parties acquired a home and real property at 
1516 South Wasatch Drive, Salt Lake,.City, Utah, in which they 
have accumulated an equity ofj^ flOO) 4 23.00; a note from the sale of 
property in El Paso, Texas, valued at $35,000,00; IRA accounts, 
in the United Funds, $17,350.00; Continental, $8,000.00; 
Magelland Fund, $19,083.00; stock accounts in the Fidelity Des-
tiny Fund, $41,263.00; shares of stock in AT&T and the other Bell 
companies plus accumulated reinvested dividends presently valued 
at $3,800.00; an account at Wilson-Davis for various penny stocks 
valued at $50.00; a 1980 OldsmokTile, valued at^^&&&?&Q; a 1982 
Volvo automobile, valued" at/ $^ a^ri>'^ iuJ; a 1986 Jetta automobile, 
valued at^$7 ,000 .00j/ a fund for payment of taxes in the Vanguard 
Fund of $1,149.00; and an Army Mutual Aid Insurance Policy with a 
present cash value of $3,100.00. 
11. The plaintiff has a retirement account through her 
employment at the University of Utah Hospital with a proc^ ent 
fa - tffip^t^t&ij; 
V%CLUG si $5,129.00; her own checking account at the Credit Union 
for the balance of $7,680.00, and a Pentagon Credit Union Account 
with a balance of $3,721.00. 
12. The defendant has a savings account at the Air 
Defense Center Credit Union of $375.00; a checking account 
through the Air Defense Center Credit Union of $1,000.00; a Pen-
tagon Credit Union Account of $275.00; and checking account at 
First Security Bank of $500.00. 
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of time and have demonstrated that there are irreconcilable dif-
ferences between them in terms of their goals, values and how 
they treat each other, which make continuation of their marriage 
relationship impossible, 
14. The defendant invested a portion of the money 
inherited by the plaintiff and it» investments have produced 
earnings ^ # $32,384.00. 
15. Both of the parties disposed of assets during the 
pendency of this matter. 
16. The plaintiff is presently enrolled in school, as 
well as being employed and hopes to obtain a Master's Degree 
which she believes will be necessary to further her nursing 
career. 
17. The court discussed with the parties division of 
their personal property from a list prepared by the defendant and 
they agreed to divide the personal items between them as is here-
inafter set out. u?< . 
18. The plaintiff desires that her/name be changed to 
Barbara Van Asdlan. 
19. Each of the parties employed counsel to represent 
them in this matter. Counsel for the plaintiff withdrew shortly 
before the trial and the plaintiff chose to represent herself, 
rather than employ new counsel. 
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From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now 
makes and enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Each of the parties should be awarded a Decree of 
Divorce from the other, said Decrees to become final upon entry. 
2. Care, custody and control of the minor children of 
the parties should be awarded to the plaintiff, subject to lib-
eral rights of visitation by the defendant. 
3. The defendant and the children are to work out 
their own visitation arrangements upon 24-hour advance notice 
with which the plaintiff should not interfere. 
4. Each of the parties should be enjoined and prohib-
ited from doue^ a-LLSlij the other to the children or taking any 
action to involve the children in their disputes. Each should be 
supportive of the other as the parent of the children. 
5. The defendant should be ordered to pay the sum of 
$175.00 per child per month as child support for each of the 
children until that child attains the age of 18 and/or graduates 
from high school with his or her age-appropriate class. The 
defendant should be enjoined from placing any initials or com-
ments on the checks^ One-half of the child support should be 
paid on or before the 5th of each month and one-half should be 
paid on or before the 20th of each month. This order regarding 
child support should become effective August 1, 1987. 
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6* The defendant should be awarded the youngest child
 p« 
of the parties, Charissa, as his tax dependentJand the plaintiff^w^- ^ ^ 
should be ordered to sign all documents required by the Internal "**- (f^ 
Revenue Service to effect this award. 
7. All child support payments from and after the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter should be made 
through the clerk of the Salt Lake County Court. 
8. A withhold and deliver order should be authorized 
to be executed should the defendant fall more than 30 days behind 
in the payment of his child support. 
9. Each of the parties is awarded $1.00 per year as 
alimony from the other. 
10. Each of the parties should be ordered to retain 
their existing life insurance policies for the minor children of 
the parties until child support for the youngest child 
terminates. 
11. Each party should be ordered to maintain such 
health, accident, dental, orthodontic and hospital insurance as 
they have available to them through their employment for the ben-
efit of the minor children of the parties for so long as they may 
provide such insurance protection under the terms and conditions 
of the applicable insurance policies and each should be ordered 
to pay one-half of any uninsured medical, / dental, hospital or 
orthodontic expenses. 
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12. The plaintiff should have her name k^affug^ fc. to the 
name of Van Asdlan. 
13. Each of the parties should be ordered to sign all 
documents and take all actions necessary to effect the provisions 
of the Decree of Divorce. 
14. The agreement of the parties regarding division of 
their personal property should be accepted by the court and, 
accordingly, the defendant is awarded, and the plaintiff should 
be ordered to deliver to the defendant, the following items: 
a. The bedroom set located in the master bed-
room, including the king-sized bed, chest, dresser, mirrors and 
nightstands; 
b. One of the large down comforters; 
c. His West Point blanket; 
d. The two table lamps with the tripod-type 
base; 
room; 
The sofa and loveseat located in the family 
f. The glass-topped table in the family room 
used as an endtable for the sofa; 
g. The clay table lamp on the glass-topped 
table; 
h. The large Sand painting given as a birthday 
present to the defendant; 
i. The Frace eagle over the fireplace; 
jo The Ray Harm eagle print; 
k. The silver West Point plate; 
1. The two pen and ink drawings of Landstuhl; 
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nw The West Point print; 
n. The "Old Man" painting; 
p. Six of the etchings; 
q. The Merimbege River painting; 
r. Two of the Hughes paintings; 
s. Two large Sansui speakers; 
t. Two channel tape drive; 
u. Two Kenwood speakers; 
v. Pioneer tuner; 
w. Phonograph turntable; 
x. AKAI tapedeck (two channel); 
y. Two of the three wall clocks; 
z. Apple computer, printer and software; 
aa. The flower set of Franciscan china; 
bb. The Sango china; 
cc. The set of Nachmann whisky beakers; 
dd. The Rosenthal crystal; 
ee. Copper pots and pans; 
ff. Pewterware; plates, cups, goblets, pitcher, 
gg. Table linens to include one of the Army-Navy 
hh. Desk in the laundry room; 
ii. The old green table from "Pops;" 
jj. One cardtable with one round piece of glass 
and one rectangular piece; 
kk. The Flokoti rugs and brass samovar; 
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steins; 
tableclothes; 
11. The National Geographic books and magazines 
and the bookcase in the study; 
mm. Handtools and power tools; 
nn. The aquarium; 
oo. All of Defendant's personal clothing and 
items, including uniforms; 
pp. All items purchased by Defendant before mar-
riage to include textbooks and records; 
qq. Remainder of the flatware set; 
rr. Balance of Defendant's business records. 
ss. Large china hutjch obtained from P. D. 0. in 
Germany; 
15. The plaintiff should be specifically awarded 
a. The Gieol painting; 
b. Two Bassett paintings; 
c. The four-channel tape drive; 
d. Two bookcase speakers (Pioneer); 
e. SANSUI tuner; 
f. Grundig console and six speakers; 
g. AKAI tape deck (larger); 
h. Cassette deck; 
i. One of the three wall clocks; 
j. Pewter candlesticks; 
k. French hutch; 
1. Twelve Hummel figurines; ^ 
m. One set of tools for use around the house/; ju£f °J 
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16. The defendant should be ordered to make available 
to the plaintiff any records that the plaintiff shall request so 
that they can be reproduced on a cassette, eh.jj?*"^^ ^ ^ "'*y^**^T 
** ' 17. Each of the parties should be awarded all items -of 
personal property in his/her possession not hereinabove 
specified. 
18. The defendant should be ordered to make available 
to the plaintiff any pictures, photographs or slides which she 
wishes duplicated and those will be duplicated at her expense. 
19. The plaintiff should be awarded all of the 
accounts of the children established with funds from the 
plaintifffs inheritance and the right and obligation to manage 
those accounts, and the defendant should be ordered to take 
appropriate steps to turn those over to the plaintiff. 
20. All right, title and interest in the home on 
Wasatch Drive should be awarded to the plaintiff, free of any 
interest of the defendant, subject to her payment of the first 
mortgage and payment of the debt and obligation of approximately 
$4,000.00 due to the Pentagon Credit Union and approximately 
$3,500.00 to the Norwest Credit Union. The plaintiff should be 
responsible for these obligations from and after August 1, 1987, 
and should be ordered to hold the defendant harmless therefrom. 
21• The Trinidad note should be awarded to the defen-
dant, free and clear of any claim of the plaintiff. 
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22. Each of the parties should be awarded one of the 
Horizon lots which have no present value. 
23. The defendant should be awarded the interest of 
the parties in the United funds IRA Account; the Fidelity Destiny 
Fund; the Wilson-Davis Account; the Army Mutual Aid Insurance 
Policy; the Air Defense Center Savings account; the Air Defense 
Center checking account; his Pentagon Credit Union account; and 
Defendant's First Security checking account. 
24. The plaintiff should be awarded the Continental 
IRA account; the Magellan fund; the family AT&T stock; her 
accounts at the University of Utah Credit Union; and Plaintiff's 
Pentagon Credit Union account. 
25. The defendant should be awarded the 1980 
Oldsmobile and the plaintiff should be awarded the 1982 Volvo and 
the 1986 Jetta. „ 
26. Th<2/$32, 384.00 earned by •tehcr-dtrf cmdant thr-ough^ hiGr 
t/.t) r A 
man^ ps3ffe?rt—&fl the property inherited by the plaintiff should be 
considered a non-asset of the marriage. 
27. The defendant shall obtain from Sears a statement 
of the account balance due as of May 1, 1986. He is credited 
with having paid $140.00 on that account. Each of the parties 
shall be obligated to pay one-half of that account balance. If, 
after deduction of the $140.00 paid by the defendant, there is 
any money due below $140.00, that should be paid by the plain-
tiff. If the amount due, after credit of the $140.00 is more 
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than $140,00, the defendant should pay that sum to the plaintiff 
or judgment shall be entered in her favor for one-half of the 
balance over $280.00. If the defendant, by paying $140.00 shall 
have paid more than one-half of the amount that was due on May 1, 
1986, the amount by which he has exceeded payment of one-half of 
the balance due should be a credit against the child support he 
shall have been ordered to pay. 
28. If there are orthodontic bills due which have not 
been paid by insurance, each of the parties should pay one-half 
of that unpaid balance and one-half of any counseling bills 
incurred for and on behalf of the children. If there is a bill 
for counseling for the defendant, he should pay it himself. 
29. The defendant should be ordered to pay the obliga-
tions due to MasterCharge and First Security Bank and to hold the 
plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
30. Each of the parties should assume, pay and hold 
the other harmless from any debts or obligations incurred since 
their separation. 
31. Each of the parties should assume and pay their 
own costs and fees as incurred in this matter. 
32. The request of the plaintiff that her fees be paid 
by the defendant should be denied, as she has substantial 
resources of her own to pay her own fees. 
33. The defendant should be ordered to verify that all 
of the checks he testified he has transmitted to the plaintiff 
-13-
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shall have cleared the bank and been paid to her. If he deter-
mines that they have not cleared the bank, then, he should be 
ordered to put stop orders against those checks and write 
replacement checks. 
34. Each of the parties should be enjoined and prohib-
ited from physically abusing, harassing, bothering, or attempting 
to intimidate the other in any way, wherever they may be or 
reside. 
35. The court, recognizing that the plaintiff claims 
that the military retirement pay of the defendant is an asset 
which should be divided which is disputed by the defendant who 
contends that the fund is an income stream, not an asset because 
it is being paid to him, and that the court has determined that 
the defendant receives $1,484.00 as retirement pay [upon which tne 
court has set the child support obligation of the defendant in 
light of that obligation as well as the fact that the plaintiff 
has accrued a retirement account through the State of Utah which 
has a present value of $5,129.00 rules final disposition as to an 
award regarding either of the retirement accounts of the parties 
should be reserved until the obligation to pay child support 
terminates. 
36. The court declares that it believes that it has 
divided the property of the parties with/$87,707.00 being awarded 
to the plaintiff and/$99,913.00 being awarded to the defendant^ 
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and the extra amount has been awarded to the defendant for finan-
cial services provided to the plaintiff and the marital estate, 
37. The court has determined that it should award to 
the plaintiff the funds that she has inherited without counting 
that as part of the marital estate, although the defendant has 
requested that this be included for consideration purposes and 
that part of it, that is, the money that has been earned from the 
inheritance^through the management of the defendant be considered 
as a marital asset. 
DATED this ^ ^~ day- o~f &yJ**W+J
 # 1 9 8 7 # 
KENNETH RIGTRUR 
District Court Judge 
H DIXON WiQLEY 
CLERK 
p a r M j h / P / l ^ k 
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